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The Entrapment Defense 
AN INTERVIEW WITH PAUL MARCUS* 
Professor Marcus, on behalf of the Ohio Northern 
University Law Review, I would like to thank you for 
agreeing to sit for an interview. Let me start by asking 
you to explain your background briefly. By what 
pathways did you become a scholar of criminal law 
and procedure? 
The short answer is I loved law school. Some people 
do not, but I did. And I particularly loved the criminal 
law and criminal procedure areas. I clerked for a 
federal court in Washington, practiced for a few years 
in Los Angeles, and then went into teaching at the 
University of lllinois, principally in the criminal law/ 
criminal procedure area. I began working in the 
entrapment area and undercover police surveillance 
probably fifteen to twenty years ago. It was an area 
that I found important to teach to students and difficult 
to teach, and not, in my judgment, a whole lot had 
been written in the area. So, I really became involved 
in the scholarly part of it. That led me to much more 
involvement in the practice area as well. Lawyers and 
judges would call and ask me either informally to 
participate or formally to handle a case or work on a 
case. It led me to do more comparative law work as 
well. When I would visit other countries, such as 
* Paul Marcus is the Haynes Professor of Law at the College William & Mary Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law in Williamsburg, Virginia. This interview with Professor Marcus was conducted at Ohio 
Northern University Law School by the Law Review on Friday, September 4, 2003. Professor Marcus 
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Brazil, Malaysia, or Australia, I would ask questions 
involving undercover police work and what they did. 
What they do overseas is quite different from what we 
do in terms of the legal issues here. I wrote a book 
called The Entrapment Defense. 1 The first edition 
came out fourteen years ago; it is now in its third 
edition. I recently re-did it so hopefully I am current 
on the law of entrapment and undercover surveillance. 
What were the motivating factors along your career 
pathway or was the pathway more experiential? Did 
you at some point know, O.K., I'm going to dedicate 
myself to this area, or did it just happen by serendip-
ity? 
A little bit of a combination. Legal research, at least 
in my experience, often involves issues that do not 
look so complex, but once you start getting into them, 
they become far more complicated. They take you 
just much, much longer to get into and then other 
questions develop. But in addition, I really would get 
involved with particular matters on both the prosecu-
tion and defense sides and that really fueled me to 
know more about the area and to speak and write on it 
because I really did have a number of concerns. 
A prominent surveillance technique is the undercover 
law enforcement sting operation. When I hear that 
phrase, I think of movies such as The Sting or The 
Untouchables, which evokes a different era. Has the 
use of sting operations in the United States been more 
or less prominent during certain eras? 
Yes, there has been a little bit of an ebb and flow, 
clearly in connection with traditional criminal law 
prosecutions as opposed to espionage or terrorist 
activities. In terms of traditional criminal law activi-
ties when there is more of a push for enforcement of 
criminal laws that are frankly difficult to enforce-
narcotics-trafficking is a prime example of that or in 
older days, alcohol restrictions-it is very difficult to 
prosecute unless you have an insider. It is very diffi-
cult to prosecute the people who are in charge of it. 
1. PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (3d ed. 2002). 
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The follow up, and I will mention this al-
though we can talk about it later, I have tried for a 
long time to quantify how many of these are going on 
out there because in my own experience I can say, 
informally, a lot are happening. It is a very, very 
common technique. But it is impossible to compile 
any empirical evidence and certainly I have not seen 
any. Let me explain why that is. There is no unified 
law enforcement agency responsible in this area. You 
see undercover police operations and stings at all 
different levels. In a small city, say one hundred 
thousand people, there may well be undercover police 
operations regarding prostitution rings-that is pretty 
common. At the county level, a little bit larger, with 
relatively minor drug offenses-not the national 
distributor- you may well have a sting operation with 
drug offenses at the county level. 
Then we move up to the state level. Many 
states are involved in all kinds of undercover opera-
tions with respect to consumer fraud, securities trans-
actions at the state level, certainly statewide drug 
prosecutions, investment scams . . . . So even before 
we talk about the federal undercover work in this area, 
there are enormous numbers in all fifty states plus the 
District of Columbia. Well, having said that, we then 
tum to the federal agencies. I have seen matters in 
which the DEA-the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion-was involved, the FBI, postal inspectors, securi-
ties investigators, treasury department people, immi-
gration officers-so you have all these agencies 
having little to do with one another and they are all 
engaged in this technique, which again can be effec-
tive or not but is viewed as an important part of the 
law enforcement arsenal. 
In terms of importance, you just mentioned the 
breadth of areas in which the sting operations can be 
used and you did anticipate the follow up as to 
measuring the frequency of sting operations, how 
important are they and what benefits do they provide 
to law enforcement officials? 
It is controversial. There are strong supporters and 
harsh detractors. I am somewhere between the two. 
The supporters argue that these undercover operations 
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are absolutely essential. There are some crimes run by 
organized crime-with small letters I do not mean it's 
necessarily mafia run, but multiple party crimes where 
you must penetrate the group. Their view is: If you 
want to find the person who is a distributor of narcot-
ics or who has a nationwide consumer scam, the only 
way to do it is to get involved with the criminal 
endeavor. To do that, we must send in undercover 
agents to buy or to sell-to become part of the opera-
tion-and that is how you break the crime ring. 
The detractors contend stings are very expen-
sive. You have to have people specially trained and if 
you do not, you will have big problems. You have to 
have people who are specially trained. It becomes 
their life for a time and they have to be monitored very 
carefully. Even so, the success rate is not always 
wildly high. It is uneven. The critics would say on 
the rare occasion it makes sense but as a general rule, 
traditional law enforcement is better. It is cheaper and 
it is more effective. 
I fall somewhere in between. I believe that 
the entrapment undercover operation creates a prob-
lem. Often law enforcement departments are ill-
advised to pursue this, certainly as a first resort, 
because it is expensive and it is uneven. And often the 
legal questions are litigated. And they are difficult 
and expensive to litigate so I think the critics have a 
point. On the other hand, I have been personally 
involved with cases where it was clear to me that you 
could not eliminate at least a major part of the prob-
lem unless you had an undercover operation. It is just 
not something you can do with search warrants or 
even wire taps because [of] these criminal organiza-
tions-again not necessarily the biggest ones but even 
the sort of "mom and pop" organization where it is 
very hard to get anyone, except the smallest fish in the 
sea, without an insider. 
You mentioned some of the risks that are inherent in 
the use of sting operations. What legal restrictions 
exist to curtail some of those risks? 
The principal one is the entrapment defense. But let 
me at least mention a couple of the others. In the 
extreme situation-and this is very unusual, but it can 
2004] ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 215 
happen-in the extreme situation, there can be a due 
process violation. If the government agents are so 
involved in the criminal endeavor from beginning to 
end-they have organized it, they are intertwined in 
it-there are courts who will say that situation is 
shocking to the conscience. That test goes back to an 
old Fourth Amendment case Rochin v. Califomia2-
which most people have had in criminal procedure, the 
stomach pump case. There, Justice Frankfurter said 
the government action was shocking. We are not 
going to condone it no matter what else is present. 
And there are such cases. It does not happen very 
often happily. Now I will say there are some courts in 
the U.S., including one right here in this area, the 
Sixth Circuit, who do not believe that there is a due 
process defense. I think they are wrong. While the 
Supreme Court has never so held, there is certainly 
strong dicta that would indicate it. Moreover, it 
would be a sad day, indeed, if we would say behavior, 
which was otherwise shocking, could be allowed. 
There are Fourth Amendment restrictions 
here as well under traditional search and seizure prin-
ciples. That is, if you have an undercover agent in-
volved, she can elicit information in terms of conver-
sations, she can certainly testify to what she observes, 
[and] testify to what evidence is given to her, but she 
cannot engage in searches that are not otherwise 
permitted by the Fourth Amendment. I will give you 
an example. If she is at a meeting at someone' s house, 
and she is the undercover agent, she can testify as to 
what people said, she can testify to her seeing money 
changing hands-that sort of thing. But, when they all 
go in the other room, she cannot rummage through the 
dresser drawers or the kitchen cabinets because clearly 
she is a government agent and she needs a warrant to 
search a house. That, too, is not going to happen terri-
bly often. The evidence normally is given to her, to 
that agent, as part of the whole operation. 
The real limitation here is the entrapment 
defense. The entrapment defense is used a lot. Here, 
2. 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
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there has been a real shift in how successful it has 
been. It is hard to gauge empirically. But from the 
reported cases, and the cases I have been involved 
with over the last dozen years, we have seen major 
changes in the way the defense gets raised and frankly 
how successful it is. 
You mentioned some recent developments. What is 
the historical genesis for the entrapment defense in the 
United States? 
The entrapment defense is unlike any other defense 
that we have. If one thinks back to ftrst year criminal 
law, traditional defenses, such as self-defense, defense 
of others, necessity, and the insanity defense-that 
sort of claim in our system comes from the early 
English common law. They have been around for 
literally hundreds of years. Now we may view de-
fenses a little bit differently than the English did two 
hundred to three hundred years ago, but the core of 
those defenses remains. That is not true with the 
entrapment defense. 
The entrapment defense does not come from 
the English common law. The English do not have it 
even today. This defense developed about one hun-
dred years ago in the United States in cases in which 
the courts began to be concerned with creation of 
crime by government agents. There was a big push 
during prohibition with regard to government agents 
becoming heavily involved in setting up alcohol 
operations essentially so that they could then bust 
those same alcohol operations. The defense has be-
come an absolutely accepted and important part of our 
criminal justice system. Even though in most states it 
is not by statute, all states have it. And there is 
certainly a federal entrapment defense, even though it 
is not constitutionally based and even though it is not 
linked to the English common law. 
You mentioned some differences between the federal 
use of the entrapment defense and the states' use. 
Could you further explain some of the differences 
between jurisdictions' use of the entrapment defense? 
Because the entrapment defense is not constitutionally 
based, states are free to do whatever they want-much 
the way self-defense would not be viewed as constitu-
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tionally based. But with something like self-defense, 
basically it is the same defense in all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia. There are some nuances 
with respect to evidence or jury instructions, but 
basically it is the same defense. With the insanity 
defense, there are some variations on the theme but 
the basic issues are similar in most states. That is not 
true with entrapment. 
There are really two basic defenses of entrap-
ment. And then, there is a third one, which blends the 
two. The earliest and still majority rule on entrapment 
is referred to as the subjective test. This test was 
developed by the United States Supreme Court. 
Again, it is not constitutionally based so the states do 
not have to follow the Supreme Court. But, of course, 
many states, including the State of Ohio, would just do 
so as a general course and because they believe it is 
the better way to go. The subjective defense focuses 
on the individual himself, and says basically the 
legislature could never have intended that someone 
who is free of culpability in terms of any kind of bad 
state of mind ought to be criminally punished. As a 
consequence, we will look at that suspect's personal, 
subjective state of mind and ask one key question: 
Prior to the time when the government tried to engage 
him, or when they solicited him, did he have a predis-
position to commit the crime? Was he likely to do it 
on his own, wholly apart from the government? If the 
answer is yes, he was so disposed, we are not going to 
much care about what the government involvement 
was, so the line goes, because this person is culpable. 
If the answer is no, he was not so disposed, then he 
ought not to be prosecuted at all. The federal govern-
ment uses this test. It was promoted heavily by an 
interesting collection of Justices, including Chief 
Justice Warren and Chief Justice Rehnquist-and 
those [two] are two who are not terribly alike in the 
criminal justice area generally. A majority of states 
would follow this, though some of our very largest 
states do not. California, Texas, Pennsylvania, and 
Michigan do not. So there are a number of important 
states who would not choose to follow the subjective 
standard. 
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The second test is called the objective stan-
dard. This was promoted most heavily by Justices 
Frankfurter, Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan-again 
not a group you normally think of together. Their 
view was that the basis stated for the subjective test-
that the legislature could not have intended nonculp-
able people to be found responsible-is nonsense. 
They asserted that the reality was the legislature never 
thought of any of this. If they had, they would have 
created a statutory defense. All the legislators did in 
a drug offense, for instance, was define the crime, give 
the elements of the crime, and the punishment. So 
their view was essentially-let us be honest about 
it-the real reason to have an entrapment defense ... 
it is as a judicial curb on extreme law enforcement 
behavior. And, because what we are trying to do is 
have the judiciary limit the executive here, we ought 
to be honest about what the test is. The test is not who 
is the defendant, or what did she believe, or whether 
she was disposed. But the real question ought to be 
what did the police do. Was that police behavior so 
extreme that we are willing to say [that] we toss out 
the conviction in order to alter behavior by the police? 
It is viewed as an objective test because what we say 
is: Look at a reasonable person standard, if the behav-
ior of the police was such that it might have caused a 
reasonable person to violate the law--one who would 
otherwise not violate the law under these circum-
stances-that behavior is improper. Objectively, we 
say that is too extreme and we are going to strike 
down the conviction. 
The last set of states-and there are some of 
these but not very many--essentially blend the two 
tests together. The norm here is to say Part One is a 
question of law for the judge: Was the government 
behavior too extreme? And if the answer to that is 
yes, then that ends the inquiry. Then it is a good 
defense. If the answer to that is no, or at least it is 
debatable, then give the matter to the jury, the ques-
tion of whether this defendant was predisposed to 
commit the crime. 
In terms of the subjective/objective tests, it seems 
analogous to the nature/nurture debate as some juris-
2004] 
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dictions have answered the question somewhere in 
between the two poles. What do you see as the pros 
and cons of each test, and which one would you 
prefer? 
I prefer a blended test, but I am not sure I would have 
it as a sort of bifurcated analysis. I like where the 
Supreme Court has gone with its test as I will explain 
in a moment. 
The subjective test has a tremendous benefit 
which is that we really look at the individual defen-
dant. The central notion of our criminal justice system 
has always been individual culpability. So if she 
really was predisposed to commit the crime, then there 
is something to be said for prosecuting her and not 
allowing an affirmative defense. The problem with 
that, however, is that identical police conduct in two 
different cases can net two distinct results because 
we have two unique defendants. One must wonder 
whether that is a sensible criminal process where 
exactly the same behavior by the government yields 
two quite different results. The second part of the 
problem with the test is: How do you prove predis-
position? Often the way to prove predisposition is to 
look at prior criminal activities. We know in our 
criminal justice system we typically do not allow [it]. 
There are some exceptions, but typically we do not 
allow prior crimes by this defendant to demonstrate 
propensity-likelihood that the charged crime has 
occurred. We do not do that for good reason-
because the person is on trial for what he did today, 
not what he did five years ago. But with entrapment, 
we allow evidence of prior crimes because what better 
indicator is there of predisposition? If a person has 
done this four times over the past ten years, [by] the 
fifth time; he was probably disposed to commit it. So, 
it is very troubling. We wonder about prosecuting 
someone for prior times even though the jury is 
instructed that it is not for propensity-it is only to 
determine predisposition. That is a pretty fine line, I 
think, to instruct a lay jury on. 
With the objective test, we are more honest 
that what we are trying to do here is: Determine 
appropriate police behavior. Certainly, mainstream 
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police activity is not really affected here. So the real 
benefit is we look at the government behavior and we 
ask the serious questions. There are two problems 
with this however. One is: How do you judge that? 
We are talking about a reasonable person who would 
be compelled to commit a crime, but the whole notion 
of the criminal justice system is that reasonable people 
are not compelled to commit crimes unless they are 
coerced-unless they are saving someone' s life- and 
we already have defenses for that. And the second 
part ... again, the flip side of the predisposition test: 
Do we really want to have a standard dealing with the 
reasonable person? Shouldn't we be measuring 
individual culpability? Now it seems to me the 
Supreme Court here has done a pretty good job 
because the Justices have retained the majority sub-
jective test so predisposition is still the test. But what 
they have said is: We are going to look carefully at 
two things. First, what is predisposition? Just be-
cause a person has a predilection for this type of 
activity does not mean a predisposition. The real 
question is: Whether he would have engaged in the 
criminal behavior, which is different. And second, we 
are going to rely much more heavily on an analysis of 
the government's behavior. If the government en-
gaged in extensive and intensive inducement, that is a 
good sign that the defendant was not predisposed 
because it took such extreme inducement in order to 
get him to commit the crime. So, in a way, even 
though the Court still retains the predisposition test, it 
looks more like a blend because we are putting more 
reliance on the government behavior than we ever did 
before. 
Do you think part of the blending you were referring 
to on the predisposition point stems from the notion, 
as the Seventh Circuit said in Hollingsworth,3 that 
"predisposition" has both "positional" and "disposi-
tional" elements? 
Yes, I think it is. Judge Posner wrote the opinion 
there. And I published an article soon afterward 
3. Hollingsworth v. United States, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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praising him because I thought he got the doctrine 
exactly right. We were both harshly criticized by 
some who said that is not what the Supreme Court 
said and that is not what it meant. But I think it is 
what the Court meant. It seems to me that the Court 
was saying in the important Jacobson case,4 involving 
the farmer who was convicted of receiving dirty 
magazines through the mail, was to look quite care-
fully at who this defendant is. Is he likely to have 
committed the crime without the government involve-
ment? And I believe that what Judge Posner said is: 
When we are told by the Court to look carefully at 
who this defendant is, we also want to look closely at 
what the government did. What the government did in 
Hollingsworth, for instance, was to set up a criminal 
enterprise-something that the defendants could not 
have done on their own.5 They were enthusiastic. 
They were greedy. They wanted to make money. But 
it is no crime to be greedy and to want to make money. 
It is not even a crime to want to violate the law. You 
have got to take steps to violate the law. What the 
Seventh Circuit said was: The defendants had the 
disposition-perhaps, the enthusiasm-but they were 
not positioned to be able to commit the crime. That 
was a case involving financial transactions, offshore 
banking, and these defendants were two amateurs. 
And these amateurs did not know how to commit this 
crime. And because they were not likely to commit it 
on their own, as a matter of law-not even as a matter 
of fact but as a matter of law-the subjective test has 
not been satisfied. And because the government has 
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-if the 
entrapment defense is properly raised in a case like 
that-the court found [that] the government could not 
prove this crucial factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You mentioned "as a matter oflaw." And earlier you 
mentioned the effort of the judiciary to curtain the 
executive branch. It does seem that there are judge/ 
jury decision maker issues that arise frequently in the 
4. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
5. Hollingswonh, 27 F.3d at 1201-02. 
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entrapment context. What are some of the differences 
you have seen between how judges and how juries 
interpret factual contexts involving potential use of the 
entrapment defense? 
Prof. Marcus: I see some big differences. Let me step back and give 
just a bit of an overview as to what the law is sup-
posed to be, or at least, what I believe the law is 
supposed to be. I think the law is that generally in the 
subjective test jurisdictions, the jury decides the key 
matters. These are fact-oriented questions about what 
the state of mind was at a particular time-whether 
the person was predisposed or not. In the objective 
jurisdictions, most commentators and judges tradition-
ally thought that this ought to be a question generally 
for the judge as a matter of law-in order to develop 
standards and determine what the extreme reach is. 
Having said that, however, the two principles have 
gotten jumbled. In a number of cases involving the 
subjective standard, we have courts who will say this 
issue never should have gotten to the jury. That can 
happen one of two ways: there was not enough evi-
dence to demonstrate entrapment, or there was so 
much evidence to demonstrate entrapment that it is not 
even a triable issue. The Hollingsworth case6 is just 
such a case where the court finds entrapment is a 
matter of law. But the Supreme Court in Jacobson/ 
and also in the earlier Sherman case8 involving a 
narcotics transaction, the Court said the evidence was 
so clear as to lack of predisposition-! think because 
of the heavy inducement of the government-that we 
decide as a matter of law. 
6. /d. at 1204. 
On the other side of that coin, there are a 
number of jurisdictions that have objective standard 
tests, but give it to the jury to resolve as a question of 
fact. So, it is a bit of an oddity because I think the 
original proponents for each side believed in a pretty 
pure judge/jury split, and it's gotten much less pure in 
recent years. Now, having said that, it is most inter-
7. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540. 
8. Shennan v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
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esting for me having been involved in both federal and 
state cases, and seen a whole lot of them out there in 
reported decisions as well. I find judges often reluc-
tant in the entrapment area. They frequently believe, 
correctly or not, and sometimes I think it is correct, 
that the undercover "tool" used was absolutely neces-
sary, and the defendant was enthusiastic about com-
mitting the crime. So we have little sympathy for this 
person. The government inducement was pretty heavy, 
but that is what you have to do to solve this crime. 
There are certainly judges who would disagree with 
that, but my experience has been more judges take that 
dim view of entrapment. 
Juries, I often find, react positively to the 
entrapment defense. I think there is a real concern 
over government overreaching--over the big brother/ 
big government . . . the George Orwell 1984J sense 
that the government is in every part of our lives and 
they can get us started in a criminal behavior and then 
end up prosecuting us for that same criminal behavior. 
Juries, in addition, do something which I find judges 
do not often do. There are exceptions. But in numer-
ous cases, juries put on trial the undercover agents as 
much as they put on trial the defendants. By that, I 
mean, the defense lawyer will go into who this under-
cover agent was-in trying to attack her credibility, in 
trying to demonstrate that she did a whole lot more to 
create the criminal enterprise than she should have, 
[and] in trying to demonstrate that she was the domi-
nant figure, not the defendant, in promoting the 
criminal offense. There are many cases where the 
evidence was quite powerful and the jury acquitted. 
Indeed, consider the two most famous of these cases. 
John DeLorean, the car maker from years ago, was 
tape-recorded in San Diego, I think. He was tape-
recorded giving the money or taking the money with 
drugs, but the jurors were so disgusted with the 
involvement of the government agent that they acquit-
ted. In the Marion Barry case, in Washington D.C., 
they did not totally acquit, but he was found guilty of 
9. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (New American Library 1961). 
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a minor misdemeanor and had been charged with a 
serious drug offense. And I think the later comments 
of the jurors made it clear that they were truly upset 
with how hard the government informant had pushed 
to get Barry to engage in criminal behavior. So, I 
think juries can often be more sympathetic than judges 
here. Frankly, with all due deference to my judge 
friends, I think jurors may understand this issue better 
than judges do with the concern that the government 
not become the lawbreaker. 
You seem to be enthusiastic in terms of the jurys' 
analysis of the entrapment issues, but you did mention 
earlier maybe there are some exceptions. What are 
some of those specifics? 
Oh yes, there certainly are exceptions. Understand 
that the entrapment defense is not going to work 
terribly well with a defendant who has been convicted 
of essentially the same crime before. I think juries in 
that situation understand quite well that while the 
government agent may be pretty sleazy, in order to get 
someone with prior offenses, you need someone like 
that and they are going to be very unsympathetic to the 
entrapment argument. That is on the side of the jury 
not reacting well. Let me give you something on the 
side with the judge reacting well. The criminal judges 
can be quite sophisticated folks who analyze what the 
operation was that the government put forth and how 
legitimate the argument was as to [the] necessity of it. 
But they can be critical as well. There is a federal 
case out of Oregon in which the agent was receiving 
large sums of money, not taxable sums of money, 
based upon arrests, [and] was given no direction and 
no definition in terms of what entrapment would be or 
how far he could go. And the court was absolutely fed 
up with the government explanation. 10 It found en-
trapment as a matter oflaw. 11 There, the federal judge 
clearly understood that the government did not have to 
do it this way and had done a lousy job in getting their 
10. See United States v. Martinez, 924F. Supp. 1025 (D. Or. 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
11. /d. at 1030. 
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agent ready and available to participate. 12 So it can go 
both ways. 
You mentioned earlier the Jacobson 13 and the Sher-
man14 cases. And certainly there has been a shift in 
the Supreme Court's rulings recently-and obviously 
the famous shift of Justice Brennan acquiescing to the 
changing times. Could you speak to such jurispru-
dential shifts and also the comparative aspects be-
tween the U.S. and other countries you mentioned 
earlier? 
Sure. Let me separate them. In terms of what had 
happened at the Supreme Court, for fifty to sixty 
years, there was a real split. It started off as 5-4, 
grouping the five led by Chief Justice Warren [and] 
now Chief Justice Rehnquist, who promoted heavily 
the subjective test for the reasons I mentioned before. 
There were always at least three or four dissenters, 
Justices Frankfurter, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, who 
said: No, the objective test makes the most sense 
because we want to curtail government behavior. 
There is currently no one on the Supreme Court today 
who, at least openly, challenges the subjective test any 
longer. The last dissenter was Justice Brennan who 
wrote this rather poignant opinion in the Mathews 
case15-arelativelyminorentrapmentdecisioninvolv-
ing inconsistent defenses-saying, in essence, "If I 
were writing from a clean slate, I would not use this 
subjective test, but I am not. Enough is enough. Stare 
decisis says I am on board." That was really the last 
gasp and that was well over a decade ago. So, there 
really has not been any dissent at the Supreme Court 
from the subjective test. There certainly have been 
dissents from the application of the test but not the 
test itself. 
Now on the comparative side of things, it is 
striking. I have not seen any country that has anything 
13. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540. 
14. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369. 
15. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988). 
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like what we have in terms of a true entrapment 
defense--even with nations that have similar criminal 
justice systems. The Australians and the English, for 
instance, would say only that entrapment can be 
considered by a judge to the extent of limiting evi-
dence-sort of like a mini-exclusionary rule. If the 
government was way too involved in retrieving the 
gun, then we will exclude the gun but it is not an 
affirmative defense. As a practical matter, however, 
that gun almost never gets excluded as they also have 
discretionary exclusionary rules, which are not often 
used, especially with entrapment. So, in the countries 
closest to us, there is a possibility that entrapment evi-
dence can be limited, but it is not a very real possibil-
ity or, at least, not a possibility seen often. Now in 
most other nations--certainly in civil law countries-
you do not see anything like an entrapment defense or 
even a limitation. They may try to deal with problems 
in other ways, but the reality is that if the elements of 
the crime have been shown ... she goes to jail. 
Let me tell you that I have had several con-
versations, both in the United States and in other 
countries, with judges, practicing lawyers, and law 
professors about this very issue. I had one French 
judge speak to me a couple of years ago when I was 
talking about both the exclusionary rule and entrap-
ment and the heavy price the government in the United 
States has to pay in order to obey the law essentially. 
I think his words were something like: 
"You Americans are so cynical about your 
government and so distrustful of your law enforce-
ment." 
I agreed, noting that it is based upon our his-
torical perspective. We are not willing to tolerate 
some government actions. But, I said to him, "Surely 
you must have problems with these undercover opera-
tions if you are trying to deal with narcotics, obscene 
materials, and fraud scams-those are areas where 
you generally see undercover operations." 
He said, "Oh, certainly we have undercover 
operations and we have problems of agents going too 
far." 
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I then asked, "If you are not excluding evi-
dence and you are not allowing an affirmative defense 
of entrapment, what do you do to monitor and limit 
the government? Do you have job sanctions against 
the police?" 
And he said, "No, not very often." 
"Do you limit the evidence even if you do not 
have a defense?" 
"No. We do not do that." 
"Do you have fines against the police in-
volved?" 
He said, "No. We generally do not do that." 
And I asked, "Does that mean you generally 
do not do anything then in cases involving this kind of 
extreme behavior?" 
And the answer was, "Yes. We generally do 
not do anything." 
Do you think an aspect of the "American" notion that 
you mentioned is fear of the government acting arbi-
trarily as applied to a specific individual or a class of 
persons? It does seem like even the Jacobson case, 16 
for example, that a government official can say: Okay, 
you are looking at a certain type of magazine . . . . 
And have you seen such fear manifest into reality in 
particular cases? 
I think it is part fear. I actually have an article coming 
out soon where an Australian friend and I compare our 
two criminal justice systems. 17 One of the major dif-
ferences certainly is we are willing to limit govern-
ment behavior in investigations much more than the 
Australians are. And it is hard to explain why that is. 
There is this distrust in the U.S. of arbitrary or dis-
criminatory law enforcement, but it is more than that. 
We are also fearful of big powerful government, 
which seems an oddity because, in the world, the 
United States is viewed as the most powerful govern-
ment. But that is not really true. We may be the most 
powerful nation economically and militarily perhaps, 
16. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540. 
17. Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice 
Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TuL. J.INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2004). 
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but our government is fairly limited in its powers. We 
have checks and balances. And we have restrictions 
over law enforcement that most other countries do not 
have. Entrapment is one such restriction, the exclu-
sionary rule being another, Miranda 18 being another, 
and also cases being dismissed under the right to a 
speedy trial, strict double jeopardy, and confrontation 
rights. And I think all of these are part and parcel of 
the notion that the government has a duty and right to 
investigate and prosecute but within fairly circum-
scribed bounds. We want this process quite transpar .. 
ent so we understand what is going on. And if there is 
a price to be paid, it may be controversial, but we are 
willing to pay that price of not having successful pro- . 
secutions here. 
I am shifting gears somewhat since we have a few 
minutes left. By looking to the future as lawyers are 
predictors, [but] not necessarily good ones, what does 
the future hold for the use of those surveillance 
techniques, such as undercover sting operations, and 
for the responses of the legal system? 
I think you have split it apart perfectly. In terms of 
what is going to happen, it is pretty clear we are going 
to see more of the undercover operations-not less. 
Increasingly, they are used in areas where we are 
seriously concerned and [are] putting [in] more 
resources-these tending to be areas where under-
cover police operations might work. Those operations 
do not work terribly well with violent crime. It is hard 
to break into the Hell's Angels or a terrorist cell. 
There actually have been few cases involving violent 
organized crime. But it is different if we are talking 
about narcotics, financial crimes, alien smuggling, and 
areas of increasing concern that may have both na-
tional and international components. Here, under-
cover agents may well be effective. I think there will 
be more of a push for this type of government activity, 
surely at the federal level, but also at the state and 
local levels. 
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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In terms of the legal response, I have seen 
over the last few decades more concerns with the 
government overreaching. In a way, the undercover 
operation is seductive. It looks like it is low cost. 
You plant someone in. You get the whole group, and 
wow! What a success! Well, it just does not work 
that way. It is expensive. You have to train people 
well, the success rate may not be great, sometimes you 
win, sometimes you lose, and it is hard to tell ahead of 
time. And I see, more and more, juries and judges in 
a way that I did not see [them] ten or twenty years ago, 
scrutinizing carefully what the government has done 
to determine if the government overreached. In the 
drug area, there have been cases where the govern-
ment was really involved-if not in the manufacture 
of the drugs, certainly in the operation of the whole 
enterprise. I'm thinking of cases where courts have 
said: No, that's just too much government involve-
ment. Yes, we will look at the predisposition. But the 
language in the opinions is clearly focusing on the 
government behavior much more than ever. The use 
of the entrapment defense in connection with Internet-
related crimes is increasingly seen, cases involving 
obscenity or sexual offenses against minors. These 
are serious crimes. But it is an area where there are 
real concerns about freedom of speech-the govern-
ment not being able to be limited in many traditional 
ways because you do not have formal meetings and 
you are plugging into the Internet. I can think of a 
case out of the Ninth Circuit recently in which the 
government was just ripped apart by the Court of 
Appeals, and I think correctly, for taking what was 
seemingly an innocent, though perhaps, bizarre, 
sexual encounter and making it into a very serious 
sexual offense in a way in which the defendant never 
would have intended. 19 The way the court reached 
that conclusion was not only focusing on the defen-
dant's state of mind, but again heavily on what the 
government had done to promote that state of mind. 
19. United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d. 692 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Do you think it is fair to say that we might be in for 
significant changes in the doctrines involved because, 
it seems from listening to you, that some things, 
maybe, are becoming obsolete? You mentioned 
government overreaching certainly as a pervasive 
theme and the idea of the fact that there is such labor 
intensiveness involved with entrapment-type sting 
operations. But yet with technological advances, it 
seems that the involvement of humans in law enforce-
ment's monitoring activities is being superceded by 
the use of technology as an ongoing monitoring pro-
cess to where it seems the line is becoming fuzzy 
-whether a shield from government monitoring 
exists. Similarly, you mentioned the Internet and the 
idea of space being collapsed, and before we talked 
about "predisposition" as having a "positional" 
element. What do you think of such notions of tech-
nological impact on the entrapment defense? 
Well, you are right, but only to a limited extent. I say 
you are right because I think there are crimes now 
where technology helps tremendously in solving the 
crimes and getting the culprits-Internet-related 
offenses, financial crimes that are done over the wires. 
Again, [there is] a real potential for serious problems 
because you cannot easily monitor. You cannot see 
when they went into that meeting or hear what was 
said because nothing was said unless there is an 
Internet or e-mail record. I do not think the doctrines 
are going to change, but there is going to be closer 
scrutiny-again, because of these concerns. Butthere 
is another part of it. I probably better address [it] with 
the law enforcement community. For a lot of these 
crimes, there is no substitute for the kind of good old-
fashioned police work we all know about. If you 
really want to bust a large narcotics group, a major 
alien smuggling ring, [or a] serious financial fraud, 
you need to have face-to-face meetings. You have to 
become part of the operation. These people simply are 
not going to trust you with any serious information 
that could, in any way, incriminate the folks who are 
running the operations. And for that, I think, you need 
the traditional undercover operation-which is why I 
think it is going to remain pretty vibrant. 
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Do you have any ideas of specific legal issues on the 
horizon line that you see as potentially providing the 
fodder for landmark or, at least, important court 
decisions? 
Again, I do not think the central doctrine as to entrap-
ment is going to change that much. It appears that we, 
as a country, are reasonably comfortable with that and 
even the split between the states is not terribly far as 
each one has moved [closer to] the middle. I guess I 
would say there are two areas that are ripe for further 
consideration and application. The first involves tech-
nology much more than ever before, particularly the 
Internet, e-mail, and the like, where things are moving 
very quickly. It is hard to keep track of things. Yet 
we know it has tremendous impact and we have 
already begun to see this in terms of upsetting prose-
cutions involving sexual crimes and minors-as I 
mentioned before. So, we are going to see that much 
more. The other, and this is [of] most interest, deals 
with international issues because these are increas-
ingly common. We are seeing cooperation, happily, 
between our government and other countries because 
so many of the drug and alien smuggling and financial 
crimes are not limited to one nation's boundaries. 
Here, we are going to have some difficult issues as to 
defenses that can be raised, as to jurisdictions where 
you can prosecute [and] who gets to raise the evi-
dence. And we have just begun to see the tip of the 
iceberg there. There is much more to come. 
For example, maybe [with] the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act or something along those lines where 
issues of extra-territoriality are involved? 
Yes. I will put in a plug here. I have friends at the 
United States Department of Justice-criminal divi-
sion . . . in the international section-and these are 
issues they are thinking about very seriously. They 
are extremely capable people and business is booming 
for them. 
As a final question, based on your vast experience 
working on both sides of entrapment cases, what are 
some of your favorite cases or favorite memories 
where the issues seemed to be so poignant to you? 
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I will mention a few. The first two are reported cases. 
The third one, I'll change the facts around because it 
is not a reported case and I was not officially on 
record. One involves a case where the government, 
for some bizarre reason, believed that drug smuggling 
in the northeast corridor was occurring out of the State 
of Maine-not a terribly wise belief. There was a 
craggy coast for landing and they had a bunch of 
undercover agents, who were themselves not pure, 
offering $1 million dollars in cash with $100,000 
dollars up front to a marina owner to essentially "close 
his eyes" while the drugs got delivered and shipped 
through there. The jury had little trouble, saying the 
marina owner was in bad financial trouble, but he 
never would have done this without [the] 1 million 
dollars cash. Another was a financial fraud case out 
of New York City in which one gets the sense the 
defendants were pretty greedy and would have loved 
to have made some more money, but did not have a 
clue on how to go forward. They did not know how to 
convert financial instruments and how to write up the 
deal. But there was a government agent involved who 
knew exactly how to do all this and showed them 
everything to do. And again the jury frowned upon 
that-entrapment found, acquittal of all charges. 
Then I worked on one several years ago where I 
helped a prosecutor in a case involving militia-some 
dangerous and violent crimes. This is an exception to 
the usual entrapment case where they planted someone 
inside the militia, and that is really how they found out 
about future crimes. That is one where the entrapment 
defense never really got raised. My involvement was 
early on-in trying to guide the undercover agents as 
to how far they could go. They had to participate 
enough to be viewed as an accepted part of the group, 
but if they flopped over the line and were too actively 
involved, the fear was that the entrapment defense 
could be successfully raised. That is very difficult to 
do because the agents [were] away for weeks or 
months at a time, and they [did] not exactly know 
where the criminal endeavor [was] going to be in-
volved. My advice was to go along with the group, 
but not to be initiating new endeavors, encouraging 
2004] ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 233 
people into areas they would not have gone into before 
that, or coming up with solutions to problems that they 
could not solve. 
